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YOUNGSTOWN, HAMDAN, AND "INHERENT" EMERGENCY 
PRESIDENTIAL POLICYMAKING POWERS 
GORDON G. YOUNG* 
This is form gulping after formlessness .... 
Wallace Stevens, The Auroras of Autumn. 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The doctrine of the Youngstown case,2 increasingly identified with 
Justice Jackson's concurring opinion,3 is an example of law that has 
been useful, but highly indeterminate, dominated more by its gaps 
than by its structure, and is likely to be under construction long into 
the future. The rule-like portions of Jackson's statements create pre-
sumptions that, by themselves, were insufficient to dictate the result in 
Youngstown itself or in many likely future cases. They resemble the 
partially completed structure of a bridge, narrowing the possible end-
ing points, while leaving open a wide variety of possibilities. It is from 
this sketchy structure of premises that Jackson jumped, figuratively, 
over a rather large gap in explicit reasoning, to the conclusion that 
President Truman lacked power to take action. 
To understand Youngstown's likely implications for future cases, it 
is necessary to speculate, based on inferences from Jackson's opinion, 
other opinions in Youngstown, and later Supreme Court cases, about 
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l. WALLACE STEVENS, The Auroras of Autumn, in THE CoLLECTED PoEMS OF WALLACE 
STEVENS 411, 411 (1954). 
2. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
3. /d. at 634 Qackson,J., concurring). As for the status of Jackson's opinion as a de 
facto majority opinion, widely accepted as a starting place for analyzing the scope of presi-
dential policymaking powers, see infra Part II, in which I describe the use made of Jack-
son's framework by a majority of Justices in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, who, together, invalidated 
aspects of the military commission system established by President George W. Bush's exec-
utive order. 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 n.23 (2006); id. at 2800-01 (Kennedy,]., concurring in 
part); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661-62, 668-69 (1981) (focusing on 
Jackson's Youngstown opinion in its analysis of presidential powers). On the wider accept-
ance of Jackson's opinion by judges and scholars as the crucial opinion in Youngstown, see 
Adam J. White, Justice jackson's Draft Opinions in The Steel Seizure Cases, 69 ALB. L. REv. 
1107 (2006). 
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what law is crystallizing in the large interstices of Jackson's framework. 
The most recent set of opinions that add some concreteness to 
Youngstown are those, together signed by five Justices, which sup-
ported the result in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.4 Hamdan considered the va-
lidity of various features of the military commission system created by 
executive order to adjudicate claims to freedom made by detained en-
emy combatants. Those five Justices read a federal statute to forbid a 
commission so structured, and thus found that it was beyond the 
power of the President to authorize.5 
The central question in Youngstown was the lawfulness of Presi-
dent Truman's seizure of steel mills in order to avert a possible materi-
als shortage during the Korean War. Justice Jackson offered a very 
general framework that has endured, as evidenced most recently by its 
serving as the analytic starting point for the dispositive opinions in 
Hamdan. His opinion divides the world of presidential actions into 
three parts: (1) actions authorized by Congress; (2) those neither au-
thorized nor prohibited by Congress; and (3) those prohibited by 
Congress.6 
It is the simplicity, malleability, and basic common sense of that 
framework that has made Jackson's opinion into something resem-
bling a de facto majority opinion. And, to a large extent, the views of 
the other Justices in Youngstown support this emphasis on Jackson's 
views. Several of the opinions in Youngstown, together joined by a ma-
jority of the other Justices, including dissenters, suggest agreement 
with some of the large-scale features of Jackson's views. All of these 
Justices apparently accepted (1) the absence of a clear answer in the 
text of the Constitution to many questions of the proper division of 
powers between Congress and the President, (2) the need for at least 
some pragmatic flexibility in working out that division, and (3) the 
importance of attempted statutory authorization or negation in deter-
mining the scope of presidential powers.7 
4. 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 n.23 (2006); id. at 2800-01 (Kennedy,]., concurring in part). 
5. /d. at 2791-93 (majority opinion). 
6. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-38 Qackson, J., concurring). 
7. Both Justice Jackson and Justice Frankfurter recognized that some presidential 
policymaking powers might exist in the absence of statutory authorization, at least in very 
limited circumstances. Frankfurter recognized both that presidential powers are not com-
pletely defined by simple, bright-line rules, and that they are highly dependent on histori-
cal context. His formulations in this regard have some flexibility in common with views as 
emphasized in Jackson's opinion, though they are different in particulars. !d. at 596-98, 
610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (suggesting openness to the possibility of temporary 
emergency powers in the absence of a prohibiting statute or of powers established by long-
standing implicit acquiescence of Congress). 
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Thus the features of Jackson's opinion that make it broadly at-
tractive are precisely those that render it highly indeterminate. Its 
rule-like portions combine form and formlessness: a clear division 
into categories, with the significance of inclusion in a particular cate-
gory substantially unspecified. In Youngstown, the content-rules de-
termmmg the existence and scope of inherent presidential 
policymaking powers in each of the categories-must be inferred 
from the circumstances of surrounding doctrine, the structure of 
Youngstown and later cases invoking it, and subtle suggestions in the 
language of various opinions in those cases. Hamdan is such a clarifY-
ing case. And yet its lessons, as with Youngstown itself, come less from 
formally articulated rules in the two main opinions than from infer-
ences to be drawn from various observations made by the Justices and 
from surrounding circumstances. 
I. YOUNGSTOWN 
A. Jackson's Opinion 
What Jackson's opinion tells us about the significance of a case's 
location in his framework is this: in the first set of cases, where presi-
dential powers are authorized by statute, they are at a maximum; in 
the third, where Congress prohibits such powers, they are at a mini-
Like Jackson, Frankfurter found a negation, by prior statute, of the powers claimed by 
the President and thought that it precluded presidential policymaking, at least in a largely 
domestic sphere. /d. at 601-02. Justice Burton, concurring, also stressed the lack of com-
pliance with existing statutory provisions for seizure and noted the absence of a cata-
strophic situation. /d. at 657-60 (Burton, J., concurring). Justice Clark, concurring, 
concluded that the President must not transgress statutory limits, but that, absent statutory 
restriction, the President has some power to confront emergencies, depending on their 
gravity. /d. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring). 
Unlike the four concurring Justices, the dissenters (Chief Justice Vinson, joined by 
Justices Reed and Minton) found no express congressional negation of presidential powers 
to deal with the strike and found support for President Tn1man's actions in other laws 
enacted to support the Korean military effort. /d. at 668-72, 702 (Vinson, CJ., dissenting). 
That opinion suggests the existence of presidential power to meet emergencies, at least a 
temporary power (existing until Congress can itself respond), to preserve existing federal 
enterprises authorized by statute. /d. at 672, 701-03. The dissent also decries the major-
ity's treatment of the President as having no independent authority (metaphorically as 
Congress's constitutional "messenger-boy") to confront even a grave emergency until Con-
gress can act. /d. at 708-09. 
Thus, while differing in a number of ways, four concurring Justices and three dissent-
ing ones at the very least leave open the possibility of emergency policymaking powers in 
some circumstances and at least recognize the potential significance of a congressional 
negation of such a claimed power. It is in these respects thatJackson's opinion is a major-
ity opinion as to the broad outlines of limits on presidential policymaking power. vVhile 
not great and specific, the agreement among these concurring and dissenting Justices is far 
from meaningless. 
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mum; and in the second, where no statute governs them, they are in 
some middling state.8 These are more than statistical predictions 
made about the likelihood of sustaining any specifically claimed presi-
dential power before examining its particular merits. Youngstown and 
later cases such as Hamdan make clear that they are also to be under-
stood as reflecting presumptions of validity or invalidity, depending 
on whether and to what extent presidential action is in or out of phase 
with statutory law.9 
Under judicial interpretations of separation of powers, Congress 
has now, and had at the time of Youngstown, enormous discretion to 
make statutory delegations of policyrnaking power to the President 
and to executive branch officers serving under him. 10 Thus, executive 
policyrnaking powers in Jackson's first category, those authorized by 
statute, rarely will be constitutionally problematic. Invalidity will oc-
cur only in circumstances in which (1) such a delegation transgresses 
the skimpy limits on transferring legislative power, or (2) the power, 
as transferred, violates some separate doctrine or textual provision of 
the Constitution, such as other aspects of separation of powers or 
some provision of the Bill of Rights. Given these doctrinal circum-
stances,Jackson's statement about the first category is little more than 
a confirmation of the obvious. 
The portions of Jackson's framework that are at all interesting 
involve his second and third categories. Here, the suggestion is that 
some presidential powers may exist when they have not been prohib-
ited by statute, and even some may exist despite a statute that attempts 
to rule them out. Each of his categories is a set of presidential powers, 
and Jackson never commits absolutely to the second and third sets as 
having many members. 11 
8. I d. at 635-39 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
9. Jackson contrasts the "flexible tests" of the second category with the "severe tests" 
of the third. I d. at 639-40. This contrast suggests that doctrine exists, or will be developed, 
for determining when presidential action is valid and that such doctrine should strongly 
disfavor, but not necessarily rule out, presidential action in the third category. This is a 
doctrinal commitment, though one of uncertain specific content, rather than simply a 
prediction. 
10. Since the late 1930s, the Supreme Court has upheld extremely broad delegations 
of policymaking power to the executive branch. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 
414, 420, 426-27 (1944) (allowing an administrator very broad powers to fix maximum 
prices and rents across wide-ranging parts of the economy); see also STEPHEN G. BREYER ET 
AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND REGULATORY POLICY 71 (6th ed. 2006). 
11. Jackson does recognize, though, that the Court had found that the power to re-
move certain executive officials is implicitly vested exclusively in the President. Youngstown, 
343 U.S. at 638 n.4 (Jackson, J., concurring) (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 
(1926)). 
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But this depends on what we count as members. Indeed if we 
confine discussion to inherent policymaking powers, only vaguely in-
ferable from the constitutional text and structure, Jackson may be 
read as not committing to the presence of any such powers in the 
latter two categories. And broad powers, tenuously justified by the 
vesting of the executive power in the President or by virtue of his posi-
tion as Commander in Chief are my focus. It is worth recognizing that 
Jackson never makes a distinction between these latter sorts of power 
and others in his initial statements creating his tripartite framework of 
powers of varying presumptive validity. 
In those most rule-like passages of his opinion, he simply dis-
cusses presidential "powers" or "authority" without further qualifica-
tion.12 So, for example, it is possible that he is referring to (1) powers 
expressly specified, or strongly implied, by constitutional text (e.g., 
pardon power, power to direct troops as Commander in Chief, and 
limited control of policy embodied in the veto), as well as to (2) possi-
ble inherent powers more vaguely traceable to constitutional text, 
structure, and history. On this view, then, it is trivially true that there 
are powers not limitable by statute and that even some of those shape 
policy (e.g., the presidential veto). 
But the interesting questions surrounding Youngstown and later 
cases have always been those of the existence of non-express or inher-
ent presidential policymaking powers not fairly clearly and directly en-
tailed by explicit grants. Justice Black's opinion in Youngstown, 
formally the majority opinion, alone among all in the case rules these 
out clearly and completely, at least in some sufficiently domestic 
sphere. 13 What can we infer fromJackson's opinion about the actual 
or probable existence of these sorts of powers? 
12. !d. at 635-38. It is later in the opinion that he explicitly addresses so-called "inher-
ent powers." !d. at 649-55. 
13. !d. at 585, 588-89 (majority opinion). I agree with the views expressed in my col-
league Peter Quint's essay in this Quartet, that it is too simplistic to see Youngstown as a 
purely domestic case, not implicating foreign policy or military affairs. Peter E. Quint, 
Silences and Peculiarities of the Hamdan Opinions, 66 Mn. L. REv. 772, 773 (2007). The ques-
tion is always one of degree of relationship to foreign or military affairs and the signifi-
cance of each such relationship to the existence of presidential powers. See infra note 17. 
Jackson seems to have found the relationship of the President's Commander-in-Chief pow-
ers and the seizure of the steel mills rather tenuous. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 643-44 
(Jackson, J., concurring) ('There are indications that the Constitution did not contem-
plate that the title Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy will constitute him also Com-
mander in Chief of the country, its industries and its inhabitants."). So in a real emergency 
more directly central to a war, perhaps, the calculus of powers would be different. But 
note that Jackson thought that Congress had great control even over indisputably military 
affairs: "He has no monopoly of 'war powers,' whatever they are." !d. at 644. 
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Jackson makes clear that Youngstown was a third category case, 
one in which Congress had attempted to negate any presidential 
power to create and then enforce a seizure policy such as President 
Truman's. 14 He finds, in the combined implications of several en-
acted laws, a statutory prohibition of presidential seizure of the mills 
under the circumstances existing in Youngstown. 15 So, presidential 
power was "at a minimum." From here,Jackson makes the sort ofleap 
to a conclusion that I described at the beginning of this Essay: he finds 
that no such power existed. Is this because no such power ever exists? 
Or is it because of unarticulated rules (as he calls them "severe 
tests") 16 limiting to a small sphere presidential power asserted against 
statutory restrictions? 
From the trajectory of the leap in Jackson's opinion, can we learn 
anything that suggests unarticulated or developing principles or as-
sumptions that would help determine when presidential powers are 
likely to exist in the second and third categories? He offers clues, but 
nothing definitive. Mter placing Youngstown in the third category, he 
examines several specific textual grants to the President and finds that 
none of these, either clearly or by reasonable inference, confers such 
powers on the President. It is fairly clear that, like Black, Jackson 
would not find that the President has any very general inherent legis-
lative power to make policy, at least in some sufficiently domestic and 
nonmilitary sphere. 17 So, had Congress never regulated railroads, it is 
clear that the President could not, by executive order, comprehen-
sively regulate them, at least in the absence of some true emergency, 
as discussed below. But this is not at all controversial and still leaves 
14. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
15. !d. at 639. Other Justices, concurring in Youngstown, reach a similar conclusion. 
And a majority of opinions necessary to the result see some form of congressional negation 
as significantly reducing the plausibility of presidential claims to power. See id. at 602 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (giving strong, and most likely conclusive, effect to statutory 
negations of presidential powers); id. at 657-59 (Burton, J., concurring) (same); id. at 
662-63 (Clark,]., concurring) (same). Even the Youngstown dissenters recognize the possi-
bility that negations may limit inherent powers in some circumstances. !d. at 702 (Vinson, 
CJ., dissenting). 
16. !d. at 640 (Jackson,]., concurring). 
17. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Emergency policies, like all policies, al-
most always have some connection, however infinitesimal, middling, or great, with military 
matters and foreign affairs. At some point, the connection might be seen as sufficiently 
tenuous to classifY the problem as "domestic." Such an approach would arbitrarily mark 
off a border between domestic affairs and these special areas of presidential concern and 
apply presumptions of different strength on each side. Another approach would see these 
considerations on a continuum, on which the connections with military matters and for-
eign affairs is given whatever (often small, sometimes negligible) weight that it should have 
in interpolating inherent presidential powers in particular circumstances. 
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emergency powers to be considered. Yet even as to these, Jackson is 
not a devotee: "Such power either has no beginning or it has no end. 
If it exists, it need submit to no legal restraint. I am not alarmed that 
it would plunge us straightway into dictatorship, but it is at least a step 
in that wrong direction."18 
But, examined more closely, what he rejects most clearly are "in-
herent and unrestricterl' emergency powers. 19 And given his premises, 
his objection might be limited to the exertion of emergency powers at 
a time when Congress is available to deal with the emergency by 
means of a law presented to the President. At one point Jackson says: 
"In view of the ease, expedition and safety with which Congress can grant and 
has granted large emergency powers, certainly ample to embrace this 
crisis, I am quite unimpressed with the argument that we should af-
firm possession of them without statute. "20 
Perhaps the opening qualification about Congress's availability 
has real significance. One can read this passage as open to the possi-
bility of emergency powers in the second category where statutes 
neither authorize nor forbid a particular emergency policy. What if 
Congress itself were closed by an emergency, a state of affairs that 
seems less than fanciful today in a world of nuclear proliferation and 
biological warfare? And what of the analogous, but much shorter 
time frame, in an extreme crisis when a generally functioning Con-
gress may take days to deal with a matter that can become critical in 
hours, perhaps minutes. 
Let us imagine a temporary bird flu quarantine imposed by a 
President until Congress can pass legislation, under circumstances 
where no preexisting statutory framework exists. One can read Jack-
son as at least open to the possibility of such inherent powers through 
a possible negative implication in the passage of his opinion quoted 
immediately above. And certainly other Justices in Youngstown are 
open to this possibility.21 
In times of emergency, a functioning Congress might reasonably 
be seen as a critical, limiting assumption of the usual division and 
sharing of responsibility between the President and the legislative pro-
cess, a division that normally requires legislative policymaking and 
presidential supervision of its execution within his branch. Recogniz-
18. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 653 (Jackson, J. concurring). 
19. Id. at 647 (emphasis added). 
20. ld. at 653 (emphasis added). "Without statute" suggests that Jackson might well 
rule out such powers in cases resembling Youngstown and in many others, even in his sec-
ond category, in which relevant statutes are silent. 
21. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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ing an emergency exception to this usual division of powers is within 
the more permissive reading of Jackson's opinion. Alternatively, of 
course, one may read Jackson as completely rejecting all emergency 
inherent powers fairly characterized as domestic and nonmilitary. 
Let us first consider the latter, the strictest reading of Jackson. 
On this view, without statutory authorization, presidential policymak-
ing powers are at a minimum because they are entirely limited to the 
more explicit ones granted in the Constitution. So the pardon power 
is in the third category, and even there, it would survive attempted 
statutory negation. And many decisions of the Commander in Chief 
need no advance authorization, though it is possible that some might 
be negated by statute. On this second reading of Jackson, in order to 
be constitutional, any sort of policymaking initiative, even in the grav-
est emergency, must be made by an executive officer acting under 
some authority that Congress has delegated. In such dire situations, a 
President's best decision may be an unconstitutional one made in the 
hope of a later statutory ratification. And at times Jackson's opinion 
tends strongly toward this strict view. At one point he says: "The Exec-
utive, except for recommendation and veto, has no legislative 
power."22 
On the surface, this alone might seem enough to decide Youngs-
town. But I think that Jackson's opinion is more one of ambivalence, 
occasionally approaching contradiction, than one of resolution.23 If 
he had relied on this point, his opinion would have been functionally 
identical to Justice Black's in crucial respects; the absence of statutory 
authority would decisively rule out presidential policymaking author-
ity. There would have been no need to find statutory negation. 
Jackson's opinion seems much more elaborate and open-textured 
than it would be were he absolutely sure that there are no presidential 
powers to initiate domestic policy save pursuant to statutory delega-
tion. And his previously mentioned reference to Congress's availabil-
ity to deal with any emergency suggests that he might be open to the 
first, much more permissive, of the two possibilities just discussed-
that of special presidential powers for emergencies. And so Jackson's 
ambiguity (reflecting, I think, his ambivalence) leaves us with a range 
of possible readings of his opinion. 
22. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 655 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
23. On this view, Jackson's opinion was in a sense simply the latest and best draft of his 
not completely gelled ideas published out of necessity, in a line of prior evolving drafts. See 
White, supra note 3, at 1123-26, 1133. 
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B. Some Initial Thoughts About Emergency Powers 
But, even if we resolve jackson's opinion to deny emergency pow-
ers, it does not definitively decide these questions, not even were we to 
treat it as the opinion of the Court to be followed until overruled. 
Today a court would have to reconsider these matters seriously, giving 
Jackson's, and other Youngstown opinions, whatever weight they war-
rant as to a situation not before the Justices at that time-an emer-
gency that made timely congressional response impossible. One 
problem is INS v. Chadha. 24 Under its rules, as they apparently would 
extend to this scenario of legislative capacity lost then regained, a ne-
gation of emergency powers would have to take the form of a full-
blown statute, meaning it would take a two-thirds vote of both houses 
to override such emergency powers, except in the unlikely circum-
stances in which a President signed a law limiting his own powers. 
This could unbalance the normal separation of powers long after an 
emergency. It would impart, to any prudentially necessary, "tempo-
rary" President-made policy, a momentum that would be hard for 
Congress to resist long after its justification expired. 
As a counter to this drawback of reading into the Constitution 
short-term presidential emergency policymaking powers, there are 
two possibilities (not mutually exclusive) that would deprive Congress 
of no more of its ordinary control, by a majority vote of both houses, 
than is necessary to deal with an emergency while it exists. First, any 
inherent power would expire with the end of the emergency, a fact 
that could be left ultimately to the courts. Consequently, there would 
be no powers to negate outside of the emergency, during its existence, 
or at all, after its termination. 
Second, Chadha might be seen as not applying to this very special 
constitutional situation in which the President is permitted legislative 
power without an approval of the House and Senate as part of the 
legislative process. Perhaps to the extent that the President can act on 
his own in an emergency to which Congress cannot respond, then a 
functioning Congress should be able to terminate that power via a 
concurrent resolution, which is subject to no presidential veto. 
Arguably, part of the justification for rejecting the legislative veto 
as an illegitimate ex post check on the scope of the executive action in 
Chadha was the existence of an ex ante legislative check. This took the 
24. 462 U.S. 919, 952-59 (1983) (concluding that the Constitution generally forbids 
the House and the Senate, either separately or together (but without presentment to the 
President for signing or veto), to alter legal rights, duties, and the content of law 
generally). 
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form of Congress's fashioning the limits of the statute that authorized 
the executive action involved in Chadha. Hence the form, if not the 
true substance, of most executive action of a policymaking sort (to 
take the clearest example, administrative rulemaking) was seen as that 
of execution of the law, the law providing the authority.25 But, our 
present concern is with statutorily unauthorized presidential poli-
cymaking powers. As to such powers, by hypothesis, the President is 
acting solely on his own asserted constitutional authority. Thus he is 
not executing a statutory delegation which would necessarily be lim-
ited in ways prescribed by Congress in advance of his action. And so, 
even if one agrees with Chief Justice Burger's formalistic arguments 
(and I do not), they seem not to speak to the best reading of the terms 
on which presidential emergency power should be interpolated from 
the Constitution alone. 
In such circumstances, it seems to me that there is room to inter-
polate a compensating power of congressional (not statutory) veto. As 
to these inherent presidential powers, often only an ex post check is 
practically possible. So perhaps Chadha should be clarified and lim-
ited so as not to extend to ex post two-house negations of these sorts 
of powers. It seems natural to view the law of emergency presidential 
powers as much more focused on necessity and interbranch balance, 
rather than on the meaning of any particular piece of text. A constitu-
tional calculus of checks seems an entirely appropriate consideration 
in the Court's inevitable choice of the shape of this sort of textually 
underdetermined law. 
Let us now consider the recent Hamdan opinion which applies 
Youngstown to strike certain aspects of President Bush's military com-
mission plan for the trials of enemy combatants. To what extent does 
Hamdan offer further guidance as to inherent presidential powers and 
as to the significance of a military context or emergency context to 
their existence and scope? While Hamdan did not consider a legisla-
ture-incapacitating emergency, some of its language might be seen as 
indicating openness on this score. 
II. HAMDAN 
A. Youngstown in Hamdan 
The two opinions that are, together, signed by five Justices sup-
porting the result in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld resolve the case based on 
25. /d. at 953-54 n.l6 (arguing that legislative-style action by executive officers, author-
ized by statute, should be seen as execution of the law and not as legislation). 
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Justice Jackson's Youngstown framework. 26 This is most clear inJustice 
Kennedy's concurring opinion, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, 
and Breyer, which explicitly invokes, and then applies, Jackson's 
framework in resolving the case. These Justices interpret two federal 
statutory provisions to prohibit several features of the military commis-
sion plan devised and deployed by President Bush. This conclusion 
places Hamdan in 'Justice Jackson's third category, not the second or 
first."27 Consequently, the jumping off point (to continue the meta-
phor of an incomplete bridge that started this Essay) is the assump-
tion of these four Justices that the President's power is at a minimum. 
Most of the other dispositive opinion, by Justice Stevens, was the 
majority opinion, which was signed as well by Justices Kennedy, Sou-
ter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. In Stevens's opinion, all five of these Jus-
tices voted to strike certain portions of the military commission 
structure.28 That opinion, if not expressly, then almost as clearly, de-
ploys Justice Jackson's analysis. Youngstown is referred to only in a 
footnote, but the note makes reference to Jackson's opinion and says: 
"Whether or not the President has independent power, absent con-
gressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not 
disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own 
war powers, placed on his powers. The Government does not argue 
otherwise."29 
26. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 n.23 (2006); id. at 2800-01 (Kennedy, 
]., concurring in part). 
27. Id. at 2800-02, 2807-08 (Kennedy,]., concurring in part). 
28. !d. at 2792-93, 2798 (majority opinion). Justice Kennedy further elaborated on 
this reasoning in his concurrence: 
These structural differences between the military commissions and courts-
martial-the concentration of functions, including legal decisionmaking, in a sin-
gle executive official; the less rigorous standards for composition of the tribunal; 
and the creation of special review procedures in place of institutions created and 
regulated by Congress-remove safeguards that are important to the fairness of 
the proceedings and the independence of the court. Congress has prescribed 
these guarantees for courts-martial; and no evident practical need explains the 
departures here. For these reasons the commission cannot be considered regu-
larly constituted under United States law and thus does not satisfy Congress' re-
quirement that military commissions conform to the law of war. 
!d. at 2807 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). Justice Kennedy did not join parts of Justice 
Stevens's opinion. He refused to decide the constitutionality of certain issues that were 
resolved against the Bush Administration by Stevens and by the Justices joining Parts I and 
II of Kennedy's concurrence. Compare id. at 2775-86, 2797-98 (majority opinion), with id. 
at 2800-01, 2808-09 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
29. !d. at 2774 n.23 (majority opinion) (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (citing 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) Qackson, J., 
concurring)). 
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Justice Stevens's opinion then proceeds to find various features of 
the commissions' structure unconstitutional, relying strongly on con-
clusions that two provisions of a federal statute prohibit them.30 Thus 
his opinion implicitly, but clearly, deploys Jackson's general frame-
work, giving powerful negative significance to statutory negation. And 
recall that the four Justices who join Stevens's opinion explicitly en-
dorse Youngstown as the governing framework in Justice Kennedy's 
concurrence, which expressly invokes Youngstown. 
But the qualifier in the passage from Stevens's opinion appearing 
immediately above-that Congress can negate presidential military 
power "in proper exercise of its own war powers"-leaves open when a 
limitation is "proper," or to phrase it differently, it leaves open just 
when a claimed presidential power is negatable by statute and when a 
President's power is insulated even from statutory limitation. Stevens 
finds that the presidential actions that he invalidates in Hamdan have 
no constitutional support in the teeth of a statute prohibiting them.31 
As with Jackson's Youngstown opinion, we are left to guess about other 
circumstances and other cases. What, if any, presidential policymak-
ing powers would survive a statute that is read by the Court to prohibit 
them? How will the line be drawn in future cases between powers that 
can be negated and those, if any, that cannot? Neither Stevens nor 
Kennedy provide guidelines, but they do provide clues worth explor-
ing below. 
Justice Kennedy's disagreement is solely as to the necessity of 
finding unconstitutional some, but not all, of the features that would 
be struck under Stevens's opinion.32 As to the power of Congress, by 
statute, to control many of the features of the commission system, 
Kennedy agrees that "[t]he [Uniform Code of Military Justice] condi-
tions the President's use of military commissions on compliance [with 
a variety of requirements]. The procedures that the Government has 
decreed will govern Hamdan's trial by commission violate these 
laws."33 
30. !d. at 2779-80, 2785-86 (concluding that the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000), prohibits commission trial of a conspiracy charge 
through its incorporation of the law of war); id. at 2786-93, 2798 (concluding that some of 
the procedures and structural features of the commissions, as constituted by executive or-
der, are inconsistent with the UCMJ). 
31. Id. at 2786, 2791-92. 
32. !d. at 2808-09 (Kennedy,]., concurring in part). Justices Souter, Breyer, and Gins-
burg do not join this part, Part III, of Justice Kennedy's opinion. !d. at 2799. 
33. !d. at 2786 (majority opinion) (citations omitted). This portion of Stevens's opin-
ion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Compare: 
In sum, as presently structured, Hamdan's military commission exceeds the 
bounds Congress has placed on the President's authority in §§ 836 and 821 of the 
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Thus all five Justices agree with a Jacksonian method of analysis 
that places great weight on congressional negation of inherent poli-
cymaking powers claimed by a President. From this common doctri-
nal assumption, they leap to the joint conclusion that several features 
of the commission plan are constitutionally flawed. In this respect 
they resemble Youngstown itself. No algorithm is given for determin-
ing the President's "minimal" policy-initiating powers that survive a 
statutory negation. Perhaps they are so minimal as to be non-existent, 
the few powers surviving a negation being those given expressly by 
constitutional text, such as the pardon power. 
But is it possible that such inherent policymaking powers are few, 
rather than nonexistent, and that the powers exercised as to the com-
missions simply are not among the few? While no clear formula is 
given for sorting out cases, there are suggestions in the Stevens and 
Kennedy opinions that might be seen as narrowing the analytical gap 
between placement of a presidential power in the third category and a 
finding that its exercise is unconstitutional. Let us focus on clues as to 
two matters: first, the significance of a military context to the validity 
of inherent powers and second, indications in the opinion of a possi-
ble openness to inherent powers for especially compelling 
emergencies. 
B. What Hamdan Suggests About the Significance of a Military 
Context to Application of Jackson's Framework 
A crude, but useful, first cut at understanding Youngstown might 
see it as indicating that, even if its framework applies to presidential 
actions directly connected with military and foreign affairs, the skepti-
cism of inherent presidential powers suggested by the language and 
results of various opinions may be lessened in such areas. 34 At one 
point Jackson says: "There are indications that the Constitution did 
not contemplate that the title Commander in Chief of the Army and 
Navy will constitute him also Commander in Chief of the country, its 
industries and its inhabitants."35 This suggests stringent limits on 
presidential regulation of nonmilitary activities within the United 
UCMJ. Because Congress has prescribed these limits, Congress can change them, 
requiring a new analysis consistent with the Constitution and other governing 
laws. At this time, however, we must apply the standards Congress has provided. 
By those standards the military commission is deficient. 
!d. at 2808 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
34. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
35. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643-44 (1952). 
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States, even if somewhat in furtherance of congressionally approved 
American military efforts abroad. 
Hamdan displays a similar skepticism of a President's ability to ig-
nore statutes that more directly implicate military operations. Por-
tions of Justice Stevens's opinion, concurred in by four Justices 
including Justice Kennedy, make clear Congress's dominance of poli-
cymaking in basic division of powers even as to matters centrally con-
cerning the military: 
The Constitution makes the President the "Commander 
in Chief' of the Armed Forces, but vests in Congress the pow-
ers to "declare War ... and make Rules concerning Captures 
on Land and Water," to "raise and support Armies," to "de-
fine and punish ... Offences against the Law of Nations," 
and "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of 
the land and naval Forces."36 
Especially powerful is the very next passage from Stevens's 
Hamdan opinion, which approvingly quotes Chief Justice Chase's 
opinion in Ex parte Milligan: 37 
The power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the power to 
execute in the President. Both powers imply many subordinate 
and auxiliary powers. Each includes all authorities essential 
to its due exercise. But neither can the President, in war 
more than in peace, intrude upon the proper authority of 
Congress, nor Congress upon the proper authority of the 
President. . . . Congress cannot direct the conduct of cam-
paigns, nor can the President, or any commander under 
him, without the sanction of Congress, institute tribunals for 
the trial and punishment of offences, either of soldiers or 
civilians, unless in cases of a controlling necessity, which justifies 
what it compels, or at least insures acts of indemnity from the 
justice of the legislature.38 
Together, these passages seem a rebuke, however softly worded, 
to the Bush Administration's broad and tenuous claims of power to 
make policy after September 11, 2001, with little or no statutory au-
36. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2773 (citations omitted). Jackson makes a similar point in 
Youngstown, though not in a majority opinion: "He has no monopoly of 'war powers,' 
whatever they are." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 644. 
37. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
38. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2773-74 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 139-40 (Chase, 
CJ., concurring)). 
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thority or even in apparent tension with acts of Congress.39 Certainly 
they suggest the existence of little or no general presidential authority 
over military affairs in the teeth of a statute to the contrary. The argu-
able exception, once again, is an especially compelling emergency, 
which is what I take a "controlling necessity" to mean in the passage 
from Ex parte Milligan quoted immediately above. Perhaps such an 
exception may exist and extend beyond the battlefield in truly unu-
sual circumstances. 
Justice Breyer's opinion for four Justices also strongly suggests 
both that, even as to military affairs, policymaking is almost always for 
Congress, but also that there might be an exception for emergencies. 
It too seems aimed at offering the executive a strong reminder of Con-
gress's role: 
Congress has denied the President the legislative authority to 
create military commissions of the kind at issue here. Noth-
ing prevents the President from returning to Congress to 
seek the authority he believes necessary. 
Where, as here, no emergency prevents consultation with Con-
gress, judicial insistence upon that consultation does not 
weaken our Nation's ability to deal with danger. To the con-
trary, that insistence strengthens the Nation's ability to deter-
mine-through democratic means-how best to do so. The 
Constitution places its faith in those democratic means. Our 
Court today simply does the same.40 
III. SoME ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS CoNCERNING TRuE EMERGENCY 
PoWERS, Ex ANTE STATUTORY NEGATION, AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
As my colleague Professor Singer has elaborated in her essay, con-
stitutional concerns about presidential powers under Youngstown tend 
to be displaced and transformed into arguments about whether partic-
ular instances of presidential action are authorized by statuteY Read-
ing a statute to provide authorization for a presidential action moves 
any such action into Jackson's first category, making it the beneficiary 
of a strong presumption of constitutionality. And, as always, a Justice 
who finds a policy wise under particular circumstances, is more likely 
39. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Setting The World Right, 115 YALE LJ. 2350, 
2355-56, 2367 (2006). 
40. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
41. Jana Singer, Hamdan as an Assertion of Judicial Power, 66 Mn. L. REv. 759, 759-61 
(2007). 
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to find it authorized by an ambiguous statute that generally addresses 
those circumstances and clearly confers some powers to make policy. 
My focus here remains emergencies that must be dealt with in 
some way before Congress can act.42 As should be apparent from ear-
lier parts of this Essay, I believe that such very limited presidential 
powers should be recognized, but also limited by judicial review of the 
scope and termination of the emergency and hence of the limits of 
the power. I take this position with some reluctance in light of what I 
believe have been the abuses of the Bush Administration and the 
great concern that they naturally cause.43 But unless one's views of 
the separation of powers validly vary from administration to adminis-
tration (depending on one's views of their policies, ethics, and compe-
tence) one must take a longer, if not eternal view. Let me attempt to 
take such a longer view. It seems to me that a grave emergency, which 
would otherwise occur in a power vacuum, must be met. It would be 
better to recognize the constitutionality of the President's doing so, 
rather than simply offer hope of ex post ratification by statute.44 
Under the more rigid view, action by Congress is always required. 
Under the former view, a greater presidential flexibility is recognized 
and controlled by collaboration between Congress and the courts. 
This suggests to me one last possibility worth exploring. Perhaps 
an ex ante statutory prohibition should not always be an effective ne-
gation of emergency powers even though an ex post negation should 
be decisive. There are a variety of reasons for considering this possi-
bility. Such reasons stem from the fact that, by definition, such emer-
gency powers would last only during that time when the legislature is 
not able to deliberate-specifically to change its "mind"-as such an 
emergency unfolds in detail. There are two elements to the rest of the 
argument. First, any statutory description of what is prohibited must 
be more general than any full description of a particular emergency. 
In responding to this problem one might resort to flexible statutory 
42. "Must" masks the necessity of making many judgments and of much balancing. At 
some point the costs of waiting for statutory authorization simply become too great. I 
believe that, ultimately, the Supreme Court should make this judgment in each case, giving 
whatever weight to various judgments made by other branches as to whether an emergency 
ever existed, whether it continues, and if so, its scope. 
43. To paraphrase Justice Jackson writing in another context, documenting my views 
on this subject either has no beginning or virtually no ending. My conclusions rest on what 
I see as irresponsible actions and rhetoric, including misplanning for and conduct of the 
war in Iraq, and a lack of regard for human rights and traditional values of American 
constitutional government. On this, I offer one article in a sea of thoughtful statements. 
See Koh, supra note 39. 
44. For an example of an effective ratification of presidential action assumed, arguendo, 
to be unauthorized, see The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670-71 (1863). 
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interpretation to argue that what the statute prohibits does not con-
template this particular emergency, even though the latter meets the 
statutory description in very general terms. 
But there is a more fundamental point. Even if one assumes that 
the statute was meant to prohibit just this sort of presidential action in 
just this sort of emergency, the legislative decision was made as an 
abstraction when the emergency was not real. If one sees the ability of 
a legislature to change its "mind" (whose "mind," I note, is differently 
constituted as members come and go) as key to a proper negation, 
then for negations for emergencies that must be met before Congress 
can act, there is a strong and interesting argument that negations 
must be ex post. 45 Of course in reviewing any such asserted presiden-
tial emergency power, a preexisting statute that seems aimed at negat-
ing certain powers in future situations would not be irrelevant, even 
under the view we are considering. Often it might have real weight, as 
a political branch input, on the question of whether a situation before 
the court is a grave emergency that cannot await congressional action. 
But weight is different from conclusiveness. And I believe there are 
strong arguments that such statutes should not be conclusive. 
CoNCLUSION 
Catastrophic emergencies aside, perhaps the "formless" qualities 
of Youngstown are in the process of taking on more shape. Given the 
balance of current Justices' views, it appears that, not only must the 
President make policy domestically in accordance with statutory law, 
but also that most of the rules governing the military are subject to the 
same statutory control. The tradition of civilian control of the military 
seems, at the level of constitutional law, to have the corollary of con-
trol by the most widely democratic process-the legislative process.46 
Perhaps foreign affairs remains an area with yet unexplored spaces for 
inherent presidential policymaking, and perhaps that area has space 
for some actions not subject to negation by statute. As for cata-
45. Some support for this position might be found in the Youngstown dissent. Chief 
Justice Vinson cites United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915), as a case approving 
presidential emergency policymaking, though contrary to an express prior statute. Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 703 (1952) (Vinson, CJ., dissenting). 
Justice Frankfurter had a very different view of Midwest. /d. at 611-12 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). And there are other readings of Midwest that would read the "prior statute" 
as not negating the power exercised by the President that was the focus of Midwest. 
If I am inclined to agree with Vinson on the larger point-that some emergency pow-
ers cannot be negated in advance-! am not inclined to agree with his view that Midwest 
presented the sort of emergency as to which a prior prohibition should be ineffective. 
46. Quint, supra note 13, at 775-76. 
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strophic emergencies-those in which, for a while, effective control by 
legislation is impossible-the Constitution should be read realistically 
to permit action by the President, but also to provide an effective sys-
tem of post-emergency congressional and judicial checks. 
